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The subject of psychosis: A Lacanian perspective, by Stijn Vanheule, London & 
New York, Palgrave-Macmillan, 2011, 208 pp., (hardcover), ISBN 978-0-
230276642 
Two recent Palgrave-Macmillan titles, Stijn Vanheule’s The Subject of Psychosis 
and Calum Neill’s Lacanian Ethics and the Assumption of Subjectivity have 
considerably raised the bar in the field of Lacanian studies. Both are expository 
texts, and both have the effect of illuminating key Lacanian postulates that 
have remained woolly and under-defined in volume after volume of 
introductory texts. I focus here on Vanheule’s book, which is a systematic 
engagement with the topic of psychosis as it emerges in different theoretical 
forms throughout Lacan’s long career. Vanheule’s study is an invaluable 
handbook for psychoanalytic clinicians working with psychosis, and it proves 
particularly adept at explicating a series of vital concepts (the phallus, the 
Name-of-the-Father, foreclosure and the paternal metaphor amongst others), 
which prove crucial in grasping Lacan’s early theorization of the causal factors 
underlying psychotic structure. In order to emphasize the strengths of 
Vanheule’s exposition, I want to take up the strand of his exposition at the 
book’s third chapter, where the author outlines the various theoretical 
components that Lacan assembles in the late 1950’s as a way of understanding 
psychosis in relation to the non-assumption of the paternal metaphor.  
 As is well known, the question of desire and its potential signifiers lies at 
the heart of much Lacanian theorization and practice. The question of desire is 
apparent in the child’s earliest experiences of their primary caregiver (whom 
we shall refer to here, for the sale of convenience as ‘the mother’). The child is 
concerned with what draws the mother’s attention, indeed, with what might 
signify her desire aside from and beyond themselves. The child is, in other 
words, preoccupied with this cognitive task of assigning meaning to the 
mother’s presence and absence. Many questions emerge here: ‘Why does she 
go away?’, ‘What draws her attention away from me?’, ‘How will I know when 
she will come back?’ These are pressing concerns, even if not of an overtly 
conscious or obviously rational sort. There is thus a rudimentary sense of 
maternal desire, and yet there is no adequate answer, or ‘working hypothesis’ 
to account for what this desire might be. The lack of a clear signifier for the 
desire of the other is, furthermore, anxiety-inducing, certainly so inasmuch as 
the little subject is in a position of an object that can observe the mother’s 
coming and going, with little understanding or control of these events.  
 As Vanheule makes clear, the question of what might delimit and 
structure the mother’s seemingly enigmatic whims becomes a vital question 
for the child. Here it becomes necessary to introduce two important Freudian-
Lacanian concepts: the phallus, and the Name-of-the-Father. The phallus 
provides a working hypothesis of what it is the mother wants. Initially this is a 
somewhat vague object, a sketchy image, hence the idea of the ‘imaginary 
phallus’ – something that connotes the mother’s desire, and that is often, 
although by no means exclusively, associated with the mother’s partner. One 
should immediately stress however that this ‘object’ or image changes, it is 
never static, never encapsulated by one single thing, because the mother’s 
desire  or, indeed, her lack, which amounts to much the same - varies, even if 
certain apparent patterns or consistencies may be detected. Also worthwhile 
stressing here is that the child itself – depending of course on the 
circumstances of its birth, family and parental care – seems at times able to 
occupy this imaginary position, as image of the mother’s desire, even if this is 
never for quite as long as the child might ideally like. 
 What Lacan terms the Name-of-the-Father refers to the influence of 
cultural and social law within the family, something which is often, particularly 
in patriarchal societies, associated with the actual figure of the father. Given 
that Lacan thinks of the Name-of-the-Father as a signifier – and a crucial one at 
that, it is in many ways the cornerstone that anchors the symbolic order and 
enables it to function – this paternal function need not be held by someone 
that we would recognize as a father in the most literal sense. Vanheule is quick 
to qualify the Lacanian concept of the father: 
the father is…a symbolic function to which all group members – 
mother, father and child – are subjected. It provides the human 
beings with an internalized compass of culturally and socially viable 
principles, and facilitates understanding of the (m)other as well as 
the behaviour of significant others.… the signifier of the Name-of-
the-Father principally names the desire of the mother…and by doing 
so, the position of the child is elucidated (p. 61). 
The paternal metaphor thus names the process of a very particular 
substitution, namely that of the desire of the mother for the Name-of-the-
Father. It is worth underlining the vexing and enigmatic quality of the desire of 
the mother which is only temporarily stabilized with the hypothesis of the 
‘imaginary phallus’ something which proves an impermanent and ultimately 
unworkable ‘solution’ to the problem at hand. The Name-of-the-Father is what 
comes to supplant – indeed, to repress – the desire of the mother; it may be 
understood as the emerging function of naming and prohibition that 
introduces and sustains social law within the family. Henceforth, the mother’s 
desire, which to reiterate, is strongly repressed (at least in non-psychotic 
subjects); it is thoroughly over-written by that conduit of social and cultural 
norms that Lacan dubs the Name-of-the-Father. We come to appreciate thus 
Lacan’s terminological choice in referring to the paternal metaphor, in which 
the naming and prohibiting function of the symbolic agency of paternity comes 
to operate. In short: it is now the Name-of-the-Father, rather than the endless 
questioning of the mother’s desire, that becomes the ‘navigational system’ 
through which the rules and designations of desire are negotiated.  
 Importantly, the phallus – increasingly less a single idealized object or 
image, and ever more a signifier of what the mother and others desire – is still 
a part of this picture, but it operates now in the context of the symbolic 
domain, in which rules of cultural exchange and the function of names and 
social roles becomes increasingly clear and refined. Clearly, all of this 
represents a sea-change for the functioning of desire; desire is now structured 
and informed by the symbolic, which means by the rules of exchange, the 
taboos, roles and key signifiers of the social group in which the subject finds 
themselves. In an exemplary passage, worth quoting at length, Vanheule 
specifies this operation and its various ramifications: 
the Name-of-the-Father substitutes [for]… the Mother’s Desire, and 
leads to the creation of new signification…the paternal signifier 
comes as a substitute for the maternal signifier and, in this process 
of substitution, desire is subjected to the broad context of the 
Symbolic, that is, to the structure and exchange of the social group. 
The Name-of-the-Father is the signifier of culture and taboo by 
means of which cultural taboos…are imposed as the context within 
which the subject and Other interact. By replacing the signifier of 
maternal desire with the Name-of-the-Father, maternal desire loses 
its enigmatic quality. Henceforth it is a signifier that can be 
interpreted in terms of the commonly accepted ways people relate 
to each other. The paternal signifier incorporates the maternal 
signifier in the Symbolic and subjects it to law…the signifier of 
maternal desire is integrated in a normative discourse on how 
people should interact (p. 60). 
One shouldn’t of course delimit the ramifications of this operation simply to 
the familial domain. The instalment of the paternal operation has wider and 
more global effects, enabling the subject as it does “to understand what 
motivates human interrelations in general, and maternal desire in particular” 
(p. 61).  
 It is to Vanheule’s credit that he is clear and specific in outlining that 
most enigmatic of Lacanian concepts, the phallus. He is likewise adept in 
explaining what is entailed in ‘phallic signification’. The dimension of the Other 
is of considerable importance in this respect: 
The Phallus should…be interpreted…in terms of desire….the 
confrontation with the Other quite brutally opens the dimension of 
desire in the subject. At first this dimension is puzzling, but with the 
Name-of-the-Father this confrontation produces the assumption that 
something must be causing desire. Phallus is the conceptual name 
Lacan gives to this presumed cause; the Phallus is the signifier the 
speaking subject searches for in pursuit of that which causes desire 
(p. 65). 
[The Phallus, however, is a kind of negativity]…the signifier people search for in 
a Sisyphus-like way… As people search for what it is that determines desire, 
identification with signifiers or traits detected in the other takes place – 
signifiers that are seen as indications of that which causes desire. These 
symbolic identifications mark subjectivity. They make up the arsenal or 
signifiers that will be mobilized when questions of existence come to the fore. 
These signifiers can be thought of as phallic to the extent that they stand in for 
the ever known Phallus” (p. 65) 
The phallus then, always necessarily linked to assumptions of what causes 
desire, indeed, to the signifiers of the desire of others, is a kind of mapping 
device. The endless search for and sensitivity to these various and often 
counter-posed trajectories of desire is never-ending, and it provides a means 
of coordination, a way of reading others and their various intersecting roles 
and directions within a social system. Understood in this way, as a symbolic 
function, precisely as signifier of desire, the phallus can stabilize the existence 
of the subject who is adept at reading signifiers of the desires of others and 
locating themselves accordingly. Such activity – and this is how I understand 
‘phallic signification’ - provides a continually re-traced map, a complex network 
of criss-crossing hypotheses of desire with which we can place ourselves, gain 
our subjective and desiring coordinates in relation to that of others. 
 We can reformulate the above in slightly different terms (and here I 
paraphrase Vanheule’s lucid explanation). Each subject, whether neurotic or 
psychotic, is faced with a similar existential question: ‘Who am I?’, closely 
followed on by another, which questions one’s relation to the desire of the 
Other: ‘What do you want from me?’ Clearly, no immediately obvious answer 
to this question can be posed. The basic question can be broken down 
however, into three related questions concerning firstly, one’s sex; secondly 
one’s ‘contingency of being’; and thirdly ‘relational signifiers of love and 
procreation’. As Lacan explains, these key questions involve deliberation on 
the nature of one’s ‘sexed’ identity; on life and existence, and their meaning in 
relation to the prospects of death; and to bonds with others, be it in relations 
of love, parenthood and so on. This takes us to a cardinal distinction between 
neurosis and psychosis. For whereas  
the instalment of the paternal metaphor introduces the [neurotic] 
individual to the social order, and via identifications even makes him 
a ‘co-owner’ of its conventions, such evolution is absent in psychosis 
and as a result the individual remains an outsider (p. 68) 
As Vanheule argues, the installation of the Name-of-the-Father means that 
cultural conventions function as a background by means of which questions of 
desire and identity make sense. “In psychosis the absence of the paternal 
metaphor implies that the subject is not named in relation to maternal desire; 
in relation to questions of existence a gaping hole remains” (p. 68). That is to 
say, the questions of ‘who am I?’ and ‘what do you want from me?’ cannot be 
answered in the conventional way. In psychosis then “[the] Name-of-the-
Father fails to function as a basis for the individual to articulate a position as 
subject in relation to others” (p. 69). 
 Vanheule continues by noting that a consequence of this situation – the 
psychotic non-installation of the Name-of-the-Father – is that it becomes 
extremely difficult to make reliable interpretations of other people’s 
intensions. Drawing conclusions regards how to manage and position one’s self 
in terms of the desire of others is thus a terribly complicated and fraught 
process. Bluntly put: “no ‘phallic’ conclusions can be drawn about the desire of 
the other…In psychosis, the confrontation with the other produces confusion, 
as do intimate relationships” (p. 69). 
 This is not only an articulate and concise description, but one which 
seems absolute apposite regards clinical work with certain forms of psychosis 
(particularly, one might add, with schizophrenic forms of psychosis). In such 
cases the desire of others seems often to veer between absolute opacity and 
voracious and toxic forms which threaten to engulf them. The severity of this 
state of affairs is stressed by Vanheule: 
the question of personal identity – ‘Who am I?’ – remains 
unanswered… Foreclosure [of the Name-of-the-Father] leaves ‘black 
holes’ at the level of a person’s identity…a framework for addressing 
questions of existence remains lacking….there is little to hold onto 
vis-à-vis one’s identity as a man or a woman, how to deal with love 
and sexuality, how to give shape to intergenerational relationships, 
or the purpose of life in the light of death…these questions cannot 
be answered in phallic terms, that is, in terms of what renders a 
person desirable in relation to others (p. 70). 
This is a poignant conclusion, and one which does a brilliant job of conveying in 
a straightforward way of immediate relevance to clinical psychoanalytic 
practice, that which is densely and evasively compacted in Lacan’s own 
labyrinthine prose.  
References 
Neill, C. (2011). Lacanian ethics and the assumption of subjectivity. London & 
New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. 
 
